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INTRODUCTION

Boundaries have become significant foci of
interdisciplinary research during the last
decade, but their roles have not been dis
cussed very often in the context of tourism
which, in fact, is crucially linked with many
contemporary tendencies such as the open
ing of borders between formerly closed
realms of the world or flows of capital and
people. This paper analyses the historical
and geographical roles of the Finnish
Russian border in relation to tourism. The
border was strictly guarded and almost en
tirely closed in Soviet times. It was a taboo
that interested many foreign visitors to Fin
land. It interested the Finns as well, because
on the other side was the ceded area of
Karelia that had been part of Finland before
the war but which was now totally inacces
sible to foreign visitors or former residents.
It was also the transformation zone of
imagined cultural landscapes. When the
physical border shifted westward after the
war, so did the Karelian cultural landscape
and its representations. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union the border has become
much more open and tourism has increased
enormously.

Boundaries have become increasingly sig
nificant foci of social and cultural research
in the last 10 years or so, largely in response
to the collapse of the rigid global geopoliti
cal division between the eastern and western
blocs, and the simultaneous increase in eco
nomic and human (refugees, migrants, tour
ists) flows has made the changing roles of
boundaries particularly topical. Where bor
der research has by tradition been a special
area of political geography, it has now be
come increasingly an interdisciplinary field.
Furthermore, boundaries are understood not
merely as physical entities but also as meta
phorical and symbolic elements (18, 16).
State boundaries in particular have for a
long time, at least from the beginning of the
current century, been understood as fixed,
stable and concrete entities which divide the
global space into bounded units and which
change mainly as a consequence of conflicts
between territorial powers (28). They have
been understood as the key markers of sov
ereignty-not only physical markers but
also symbolic and cultural ones. The exis
tence of national identities and the continual
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by a space offlows, to employ the concepts
of Castells (4 ). This flow rhetoric is persua
sive and has been used increasingly in many
contexts. The space of flows, it is often ar
gued, will reduce the roles of the 'sover
eignty' and 'identities' of states and chal
lenge national identities and boundaries.
Side-by-side with these tendencies, nation
alism and ethno-regionalism, linked with the
flows of displaced people and refugees, are
creating new boundaries and challenging the
relations between existing social and physi
cal spaces. In many cases this has given rise
to conflicts and the drawing of new bounda
ries between social groups, 1.e. re
territorialization.

legitimation and signification of boundaries
have thus been understood as two sides of
the same coin. Much scientific research has
also contributed to this state-centred outlook
on the world. As far as the acceptance of
nation and state as given are concerned, Ag
new talks about methodological nationalism,
noting that this idea has lain behind both
mainstream and much radical social science
(1). Methodological nationalism also effec
tively implies a view of the world as a grid
of territories with more or less exclusive
boundaries.
Following the radical changes in the global
geopolitical landscape, boundaries are now
increasingly being interpreted as vanishing
elements in spatial transform rather than sta
ble physical lines. This will, as many schol
ars have argued, reduce the meanings of
state boundaries and sovereignty and, fi
nally, lead to de-territorialization and re
territorialization, i.e. changes in the func
tions and meanings of boundaries. These
notions are commonly associated with the
works of the well-known philosophers
Deleuze and Guattari, who developed them
to describe the effects of capitalism on pre
vious fixed orders of class, kinship and
space, but they have become much-used
metaphors for cultural, social and spatial
change in the current geopolitical literature
(18).

In spite of the new interest in all kinds of
'flows' across boundaries in the contempo
rary world, scholars have not paid much at
tention to the roles of boundaries from the
perspective of tourism. Besides its immense
economic role in the contemporary world,
tourism is a field where border crossings
occur on all spatial scales, from personal and
local to global, from sub-national boundaries
to international ones. In this context borders
may be landscape elements of value for
tourism as such (e.g. ideological or cultural
borders) or they may be just obstacles that
manifest themselves as 'friction' restraining
movement. A few authors have evaluated
the meanings of borders for tourism and
cross-border shopping the last few decades,
but as shown by Timothy (29, 30; see also
3 ), the mapping of the links between tourism
and borders has been a marginal topic for
both political geographers and tourism re
searchers.

Much of the re-/de-territorializing discourse
is linked with the ideas of globalization or
the economic, cultural and environmental
transformation of the global space. Scholars
are not unanimous about the meanings of
this phenomenon or its effects on global
local relations and on boundaries, but the
new rhetoric reflects changes in global ac
tivity spaces. This rhetoric often represents
boundaries as symbols of a past world char
acterized by the space of places that will be
replaced by a dynamic world characterized

This paper aims to provide some theoretical
and concrete ideas for border studies in con
nection with tourism and to serve as a back
ground to a discussion of the arguments that
have been put forward regarding the 'disap
pearance of boundaries' (and nation-states)
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cultural and economic contexts. It is also
crucial to approach borders historically,
since their meanings are not stable but
change as the contexts change.

in the current world. Some theoretical per
spectives will be discussed that might be
useful for multidimensional boundary stud
ies. The key argument is that instead of un
derstanding boundaries as fixed lines, we
should understand them as more multidi
mensional phenomena.

To illustrate these points, we will analyse
the historical development and geographical
roles of the Finnish-Russian border in rela
tion to tourism. The meanings of this border
have varied greatly in the course of the years
both in Finland and in Russia, and the pre
vailing, dominant interpretations have pro
vided different possibilities for tourism. Be
fore World War II it was the ultimate barrier
and dividing line that separated the East
from the West and essentially eliminated
tourism but, since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it has become much more open and
tourism has increased markedly.

Boundaries are not only lines but meaning
ful, historically-contingent symbols and in
stitutions which are in many ways sedi
mented in social practices and discourses,
and which manifest themselves on different
spatial scales, from personal and local to
global (17, 18). This means that an under
standing of the contemporary meanings of
specific boundaries requires several 'keys'
which are linked with economics, politics,
administration and governance as well as
with legislation and local and national/local
attitudes/identities. All these elements re
flect power relations in complicated ways.
Boundaries may be simultaneously histori
cal, natural, cultural, political or symbolic
phenomena and each of the above elements
may be exploited in diverging ways in the
construction of territoriality and the ideas of
borders as prohibiting and allowing spatial
interaction-including tourism.

FINNISH-RUSSIAN BORDER LAND
SCAPES AND TOURISM BEFORE
WORLD WAR II
The Finnish-Russian boundary and border
area are located partly in the area of Karelia,
where the western and eastern cultures meet.
Its location has changed many times as a
consequence of territorial disputes. From
World War II onward this border was the
longest ideological boundary between a
western capitalist state and the Soviet Un
ion. Finnish-Russian border areas have for a
long time been characterized by the signs of
national peripherality: dependence on re
source-based industries, the large signifi
cance of the public sector in employment
and low population density. Therefore the
recent opening of the border to tourism and
other cross-border interactions may be seen
as being of crucial importance for the devel
opment of the peripheral areas on both sides
and for integration of these areas into the
wider economy.

Borders may exist as one part of the 'discur
sive landscape' of social power which ex
tends itself into the whole of society and is
produced and reproduced in various social
and cultural practices and discourses. This
means that different borders may have dif
ferent meanings in different contexts.
Therefore, as has been suggested earlier (17,
18), it is crucial to approach borders con
textually. The context is not merely a spe
cific border area in itself, as has typically
been the case in traditional border studies in
political geography, for each border receives
its meanings from broader contexts in the
societies in question and from the links be
tween these societies and larger geopolitical,
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Finland became an autonomous state in the
Russian Empire in 1809, after being part of
Sweden for 600 years. This change was
crucial, as it meant that the focus of the
emerging flows of tourism moved eastwards
and St. Petersburg became a new power
centre for the upper classes. Autonomous
Finland became a 'foreign country' for these
classes and Finnish tourism services began
to develop rapidly. Towards the end of the
19th century, tourism emerged as a new in
dustry in Eastern Finland. Some visitors
were also interested in the border with Rus
sia, the 'Bear of the East' (14, p. 119-120),
and a particularly visible element in the
emerging tourism landscape was the Teri
joki villa area, established in the 1870s.
This area was on the Finnish side of the bor
der, but it emerged mainly as a result of the
strong regional influence of St. Petersburg
and the predilections of rich Russian fami
lies.

bolic and cultural roles as outposts of the
western cultural realm. Commercial con
nections with the east were severed (19),
particularly with the significant economic
sphere and market area centred on St. Pe
tersburg. Illegal interaction over the bound
ary occasionally took place, which caused
diplomatic conflicts. The villa area of Teri
joki now became a destination for Finnish
tourists, and the new, closed border itself
became an increasingly important object for
the tourist gaze. Visits to Finnish border
villages were recommended, particularly for
the younger generations, the motives being
bound up with ideological education as well
as tourism (25, p. 126).
Tourist Images of the Karelian
Border Areas

The Karelian area has never in its entirety
been a part of Finland, but has been divided
between Finland and Russia in various ways
(Fig. 1). In spite of this, the Karelian heri
tage is an integral part of the Finnish na
tional culture and the landscapes of the re
gion have been represented consistently for
more than a hundred years as a part of the
national imagery of Finland. The emer
gence of the Karelian territorial myth can be
traced to the rise of nationalism and a na
tionalistic culture in 19th century Finland.
An especially strong boost was given to this
process by the publication of the Kalevala,
the Finnish national epic, containing folk
ballads collected from Karelia. This trans
formed the popular impression of the re
mote, primitive territory of Karelia as a dis
tant, poor, miserable and backward forested
borderland into that of a mythical seat of
folk culture that has conserved its timeless
natural wonders and cultural treasures over
the centuries. Around the turn of the cen
tury the Karelian culture in general and the
Karelian landscape in particular were the
main themes in the thinking of the national

When Finland gained its independence in
1917, this caused a very significant change
in territorial strategy. Whereas the border
between Finland and Russia had been open
during the years of autonomy, the new inde
pendent state had to secure its boundaries
and use them to signify its territoriality. The
boundary established in the Peace of Tartu
(1920) was located on the same place as that
of the Grand Duchy of Finland, but its prac
tical significance was completely different.
The power of the state was expressed in the
border areas in the form of a border guard
system and, thus, whereas interaction and
communication over the boundary had been
possible earlier, the new boundary was
closed.
The closure of the boundary marked a radi
cal change in the conditions of life for the
less developed areas of eastern and south
eastern Finland and promoted both their
economic peripheralization and altered sym-
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increase the political reliability of the popu
lation. While these activities are a good ex
pression of the nationalization of peripher
ies, it was at the same time difficult for the
local people to comprehend why they had
been 'relocated' into a periphery and why
their rights, which once extended fairly
freely across the border, now had to be cur
tailed (17). During the 1920s the boundary
became a symbol through which both the
distinction between Finland and the Soviet
Union and their dependence on each other
were expressed.
The meanings of the
boundary were hence effectively politicized.

romantic movement of Finnish artists and
intellectuals. Painters, writers, architects
and composers as well as folklorists, histori
ans and geographers were seeking their in
spiration from the natural scenery and cul
tural environments of this region. Soon the
eastern forests and the expanses of hills and
lakes were being regarded as an ideal Fin
nish landscape and a fundamental part of the
national landscape gallery (22, p. 118-119).
But the eastern borderlands of Finnish
Karelia were not only a part of the ideal rep
resentation of a nation state, they were also
an area of cultural otherness, the core area of
the Finnish Orthodox culture. Before the
Second World War, most of the Orthodox
population lived in the eastern part of Fin
land, mostly in the Karelian borderlands,
and it was also in this region that the visible
traits of Orthodox culture--churches, chap
els and cemeteries-were seen in the local
landscape more frequently and more power
fully than anywhere else in Finland. In
other words, it was the heartland of a Fin
nish-Karelian Orthodox culture.

The inhabitants of the Karelian borderlands
were especially under scrutiny. Because the
core area of the Orthodox Church was also
the border area between Finland and the So
viet Union, the loyalty and patriotism of its
inhabitants was vital to the state authorities.
Thus the nationalization processes had two
goals: to integrate the Orthodox people
more deeply into Finnish society-which
served the needs of national security and
defence-and to represent them and their
cultural landscape to the rest of the Finns as
an essential, if peculiar, part of the nation
(22, p. 118-125).

Before the Second World War, the Finnish
Orthodox Church had some 70,000 mem
bers, less than one percent of the total
population (11). Even in Finnish Karelia the
Orthodox represented only a small minority
among the inhabitants, but their different
religion, their ties with Russian culture and
the fact that they lived near the border made
them a visible element in the processes of
nationalization that took place in the periph
eral areas of the young nation.

Travel and tourism was one significant strat
egy that was adopted to make the borderland
area of Karelia and its culture known nation
wide. Travel within Finland, and especially
in the borderlands, was seen as a part of the
process of nationalization, designed to
strengthen the feeling of togetherness and
thus to foster a sense of an 'imagined com
munity' called Finland, a community with
clearly-defined borders (2). As Siiskonen
(25, p. 124) writes, domestic tourism was
understood as significant both for 'national
integration' and for the 'spiritual and physi
cal condition of youngsters' and 'the will for
national defence'.

The territorial aim of boundary reinforce
ment in the 1920s and 1930s was national
integration within Finland. A great effort
was made in developing the peripheral bor
der areas and improving the living condi
tions of their inhabitants. The key motive
was to foster a spirit of nationalism and to
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The tourist images of the Karelian border
areas in the 1920s and 1930s were of a land
scape of cultural peculiarity, but not too pe
culiar. Under the national tourist gaze, the
borderland Orthodox culture and the local
landscape were used to symbolize the Kale
vala heritage, local religion, a sense of
community and the conservative values of
traditional country life.. These images pre
sented Orthodox Karelia as different, strange
and extraordinary, but at the same time very
familiar and, above all, very Finnish. It was
a territory where, in the stereotypic words of
contemporary travel books and brochures,
there lived a lively, talkative, colourful peo
ple known as the Karelians who, despite
their different dialect, habits and faith, were
Finns in exactly the same way as everybody
else. Thus the Karelian Orthodox culture
acquired meanings associated with the val
ues of both ancient and national aspirations,
allowing the local Orthodox culture and its
landscape elements to be seen as parts of
wider nationalization processes in the border
areas (22, p. 118-128).

and tolerated while at the same time ethnic,
cultural, and historical unity with the rest of
the nation were stressed. Thus, the nation
alistic element was a fundamental underpin
ning of the emerging tourist traffic.
The border itself also held some excitement
for tourism, again very much in the nation. alistic sense. The waterways which were
part of the Finnish-Soviet border up to
World War II became significant symbols of
the border for the Finns. The River Rajajoki
in particular became a national landscape,
and the Rajajoki bridge took on the status of
an internationally-renowned crossing point
between the two worlds, a place that western
tourists often visited. Russian refugees re
ferred to this place as the "Gate to Hell"
(17). In the Finnish national rhetoric, even
the physical environment of the river repre
sented a strong symbolic border between
two major European landscape regions: the
"Finnish" and "West European" Karelian
Isthmus to the west and the "Russian" and
"East European" grass steppe to the east (20,
p. 37-38). Consequently, the physical land
scape in the other parts of Karelia, especially
the Baltic Shield as a common bedrock un
derlying the Scandinavian areas from the
Atlantic to the White Sea, was seen as an
area of homogeneity and thereby as a part of
the natural region of Greater Finland (13).

Even the Orthodox monasteries which still
existed in Karelia, and which were mostly
seen as strange, medieval Russian institu
tions that had no place in an independent,
Lutheran, western Finland, were now toler
ated. The monastery of Valamo, for exam
ple, was classified as one of the sights on the
main tourist route through Finland. It was
now a place that offered tourists a sense of
the East, an opportunity to take a look at a
Russian culture that no longer existed else
where (25, p. 130). For the emerging tourist
industry of a young nation, it offered a feel
ing of otherness within the home country at
relatively low cost (23).

THE KARELIAN TOURIST
LANDSCAPE SINCE 1945
Rebuilt Uniqueness
World War II changed the situation perma
nently on both the symbolic and the con
crete, material level. Finland was forced to
cede to the Soviet Union huge territories that
included the Petsamo and Salla areas in
Lapland and most parts of Karelia, which
together constituted about 10% of the total

The tourist image of the Karelian border
lands was hence both discriminating and
connective. The distinctive images of the
local culture and its traits were presented
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the cultural heritage of the area. Following
the Second World War, the new border area
of Northern Karelia was the only region
where the Orthodox Church had once had a
significant role as a part of the local culture.
Nevertheless, Northern Karelia and its Or
thod�x environment were different from the
lost border territories. Despite the long his
tory and tradition of the local Orthodox par
ishes, the area actually lacked many of the
visible features of that tradition (22, p. 208209).

area of the nation-state. This also meant that
420,000 refugees had to leave their homes
(12, p. 86). Evacuation marked the end of
the previous cultural territorial system and
the beginning of a new one. The closing of
the border at its new location as a conse
quence of the Second World War altered the
spatial dimensions of the Karelian territorial
myth once again. In the new situation most
of the Karelian heritage, including the bor
der landscapes, had to be re-created and re
invented in the areas that remained on the
Finnish side.

Regardless of the marginality of the local
Orthodox heritage, a conscious representa
tion and manifestation of this phenomenon
began in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and
from that time onwards the old symbols of
the Karelian border areas such as national
costumes, traditional Kalevala rune-singers
and the Orthodox faith have been used to
convey a popular impression of the region.
In addition, the Orthodox culture has played
a significant role as part of the local territo
rial identity-building processes in Northern
Karelia. There has been a desire to see both
the visible and imagined Orthodox land
scapes not only as a setting for the local
Orthodox parishes but also as a distinctive
feature of the whole territory, regardless of
the fact that only around 7 percent of the
local population belong to the Orthodox
Church (22).

After the war, images of the ceded areas
were removed from the national landscape
gallery, although they continued to exist as
distant landscapes of nostalgia-the beauti
ful and beloved lost Karelia (6, p. 109). A
new Karelian landscape now had to be
found inside the Finnish territorial borders.
Fortunately a candidate territory still existed
in the new eastern border area, the region
called Northern Karelia, and quite soon after
the war its hilly, lakeside landscape came to
be treated as a new icon of Karelia itself ( 1 7,
24).
In the 1950s, two new national parks, Ou
lanka and Petkeljarvi, were created along the
border, replacing the former ideal Karelian
landscapes on the other side (6). Fortunately
the old Karelian landscape symbol, the hill
of Koli, still existed on the western side of
the border, and this was represented as the
dominant symbol of Finnish Karelia through
a wide range of picture books and travel
prospectuses. Koli became an important
travel destination, partly on account of the
beauty of its physical landscapes and partly
because it symbolized the Karelian heritage
(24).

The new "visibility" of the Orthodox culture
in Northern Karelia has been manifested
particularly in the most recent examples of
the built environment, so that Orthodox
features are present in the landscape today
through various neo-traditional symbols and
elements. New churches built according to
the heritage of the Karelian wooden chapels,
Greek-style "traveller's crosses" by the
roadsides and traditional Karelian-Orthodox
graveyard memorials are all representations
of the emerging identity of the Finnish Or-

Thus it was not just the physical environ
ment of Northern Karelia that fitted into the
framework of an ideal landscape, it was also
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thodox population. In these cases, to be in
the landscape is also to be seen in the land
scape. On the other hand, these neo
traditional manifestations and representa
tions are also part of the intersubjective ter
ritorial images created by tourism, which it
is hoped will increase in Eastern Finland in
general and in Northern Karelia in particu
lar. Many of the newest elements in the tra
ditional Orthodox landscape have been built
with substantial support from the local
authorities and tourist enterprises, and this
introduces new elements into the meanings
associated with the landscapes. These land
scapes are now read and interpreted through
the medium of the heritage industry, by
tourists who expect to see them regardless of
how genuine or otherwise they actually are
(17, p. 129-131; 22, p. 222-234).

centres and museums, have become a visible
part of the historical landscape across the
eastern borderlands, particularly along the
tourist road of the Bard and Boundary (Fig.
2).
The tourist image of the present-day border
area of Eastern Finland contains mixed ele
ments of untouched, picturesque sights and
cultural factors such as Orthodox environ
ments and traditions, the heritage of the Ka
levala and the historical battle sites of recent
wars (5, p. 31). The eastern heritage, espe
cially the Orthodox religious culture, is now
seen as an essential part of this nostalgic im
age of the area. The idealistic and nostalgic
past and the imagined landscape related to it
can be located in a distant, marginal border
area, where they have been marked, con
served and preserved, or even re-built or re
produced, to meet the needs of modem
heritage making and tourism.

In the case of a lost past and lost territories,
the notion of nostalgia is a key element in
heritage interpretation. The word nostalgia
is normally used to mean a longing for
something from the past, including a longing
to escape from the present to past times and
places and. to the social structures related to
them (9). Karelia and its landscapes, both
those remaining within the national borders
and those on the other side of the border,
have been implicated in continuous proc
esses of nostalgia. In post-war Northern
Karelia this has been manifested as a distinct
heritage and a set of memories related partly
to the lost territories, and travel brochures
and tourist advertisements since the 1960s
have represented the region as a nostalgic,
static land of memories (8).

The Ideological Border as
a Tourism Destination

Looked at on the scale of world geopolitics,
Finland belonged after World War II to the
disputed, indeterminately neutral camp lo
cated somewhere between East and West.
Its eastern boundary became the longest in
terface between the leading socialist state
and a W estem capitalist state, over 1200 km
in length. It also became a fitting illustra
tion of an ideological boundary, and was
quoted as such in political geography text
books from time to time (21).
The area became concomitantly an interest
ing object for western tourists. Since the
mid-1960s tourism has become an increas
ingly crucial industry in these areas. As
Kosonen and Pohjanen write: "(for these
people) the mystical border between east
and west was often an overwhelmingly in
teresting object" (10, p. 451). This meant

As a part of this heritage-making and sense
of nostalgia, the historical sites and land
scapes of the Second World War have
emerged as borderland tourist attractions of
a new kind. During the last ten years or so,
all manner of war sites such as battlefields,
old dugouts and pillboxes, and also heritage
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the terms of Martinez (15). Many of the lo
cal authorities on the Finnish and Russian
sides have been ready to play an active role
in this, hoping to open up routes and con
nections in the future and thereby develop
the economics of both areas.

problems for the closed border, and more
and more violations were recorded. Most
foreigners travelling by car went to south
eastern Finland, but since the border was
closed and strictly controlled, the increase in
tourism simply meant more work for the
Finnish Border Guard Service. During the
mid- l 960s, Kosonen and Pohjanen write,
the border, frontier zone and border guard
activities themselves became significant
objects for tourists! More and more people
were arrested in the frontier zone, but the
number of actual illegal crossings remained
very small. The increase in pressure on the
border area was much greater in the south
eastern part of the country than in Northern
Finland, due mostly to the fact that access to
the border areas was much more difficult in
the northern periphery than in the southern
part of the country.

Even though interaction over the boundary
has increased markedly, the border still is a
line between two completely different so
cieties, and the gap in the standards of living
is among the largest in the world. Hence, it
is probable that the Finnish-Russian bound
ary will continue in the near future to be
relatively strictly controlled on both sides.
These areas will not be transformed very
quickly into 'integrated borderlands' where
unrestricted movements of people, goods,
and ideas prevail (19).
Although there had been extensive trade
between Finland and the Soviet Union, the
border had been strictly controlled and
movement across had been permitted only in
certain controlled places. This made some
forms of tourism-mainly to the former
Finnish city of Vyborg and to Leningrad
possibly for the Finns, and also there were
joint construction projects. Co-operation
was nevertheless strictly regulated and or
ganized at the state level. The Finnish
economy was greatly dependent on Soviet
trade, and more than 20% of Finnish exports
went to the Soviet Union in 1985-86. With
the decline of the Soviet system, exports
collapsed, so that the proportion was only
13% in 1990 and less than 3% in 1992 (27).
Now it is rising again gradually, so that 6%
of exports went to Russia in 1996 and 7.1%
of imports came from there. Russia now
ranks fifth among both the countries of des
tination and the countries of origin in the
Finnish foreign trade statistics (19).

FROM A CLOSED BORDER
TO AN OPEN ONE
The collapse of the communist regime has
radically altered the economic, political and
military landscapes of Europe, and changes
have also occurred in the peripheral areas
around the Finnish-Russian border. The po
litical and economic changes in eastern
Europe have been crucial as far as the image
of the border is concerned, and we have now
entered a new stage in the interpretation of
its roles and the establishment of economic
practices. The idea is now emerging of the
border as an interface, a point of contact or
even a frontier with a new social and eco
nomic significance based on personal inter
action between traders. Its economic impli
cations are now being realized increasingly
extensively on both sides (19). The border
area is expanding and the forms of interac
tion are becoming more versatile. The for
merly distant border areas are now turning
into 'interdependent borderlands', to employ

As far as the whole present border area, al
most 1300 kilometres in length, is con-
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cerned, 70 years of virtual inactivity had
made the peripheral areas on both sides
highly dependent on their own national po
litical and economic centres. They had
hence become typical 'alienated border
lands' (15). Cross-border traffic began to
intensify in many places around 1990, and
the former Finnish 'city tourism' to Vyborg
and Leningrad became increasingly a matter
of business and shopping trips and visits
made by people of Karelian origin to their
former strictly-closed home areas.

nomic success of the Finnish border areas,
as they spend a lot of money there. Russian
has never been a particularly popular lan
guage among Finnish students, but eco
nomic facts are now making it increasingly
more popular, e.g. for the facilitation of
business in south-eastern Finland (19).
Since the signing of the agreement on 'co
operation between neighbouring areas' be
tween Finland and Russia in 1992, the local
authorities on both sides have actively pro
moted cross-border action to open up routes,
establish connections and develop the econ
omy of the border area. The total number of
crossing-points is now 26, including six that
are open to international traffic. The other
20 crossing-points are intended for goods
traffic-mainly timber transport-and/or
crossings by Finnish and Russian citizens
only (19).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union finally
opened up Russian Karelia to tourism.
\\Then the border became more open there
were still about 180,000 ·of the Finnish refu
gees from the region alive, and an immedi
ate boom in nostalgic return journeys en
sued, with a total of 1.26 million crossings
of the border in 1991-1992. Every Finn be
came familiar with TV programmes and
newspaper photographs showing former
refugees searching the fields and forests of
Karelia for reminders of their lost homes
and past spatial identities which had been
broken off as a consequence of the war.
These border crossings were visits to the lost
past as much as journeys undertaken in the
present (17).

Total border crossings by passengers rose
from O.96 to 4 .1 million between 1990 and
1996, the number of Russian passengers in
creasing rapidly from 1994 onwards, to
reach almost two million in 1997, while the
number of Finns seems to be decreasing af
ter the first boom. This is probably due to
the fact that the old Karelian refugees have
now visited their former home areas and
have often failed to find any concrete fea
tures to match against their memories, so
that this specific form of tourism and
movement across the border has reached
'saturation point'. On the other hand, visits
by Russians to Finland have been increasing
continually, in spite of the serious economic
problems. The well-off Russians are in
creasingly eager to come to Finland to spend
their holidays at spas and other holiday re
sorts. The increasing flows of people have
also created images of undesirable elements,
this having been particularly true at the time
when movements across the border were
first beginning. This has meant that topics

An almost completely new phenomenon has
been the greater freedom of Russian travel
to Finland. This can be seen clearly from
the statistics. Where 8500 Russian cars
crossed the Finnish border in 1991, for in
stance, the figure five years later was almost
170,000. Russian visitors spent a total of
549,000 nights in Finland in 1997, which
ranks them in second place after Swedish
visitors (26). While relations between the
Finns and Russians have been for a long
time highly sceptical, local attitudes towards
Russian tourism are gradually becoming
more favourable. They are now perceived
as being a significant factor for the eco-
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such as smuggling, the threat of organized
crime and control of alcohol flows have
been common in the Finnish media during
the 1990s (19).

rates of alcohol consumption and crime, to
gether with the rise in prostitution and vene
real diseases, have been very much to the
fore in the media (19).

The activities associated with the opening of
the Finnish-Russian border have not only
given rise to various 'flows' but have also
created new social and economic practices
that are gradually turning the border areas
into 'interdependent borderlands', to employ
the concept of Martinez (15). Civil servants
and entrepreneurs in Finnish border com
munes are looking forward to shedding their
former peripheral location and opening up
links with areas in Russia, an optimism
partly motivated by the chance to obtain re
sources for this through European Union
programmes. Much effort has been concen
trated on developing the infrastructure for
rendering border crossings easier-particu
larly customs facilities and other services.
The opening of the border has also increas
ingly encouraged the 'place-marketing' (7)
of border crossings: Finnish local authori
ties and consulting firms have been active
and many plans have been produced to re
alize the potential of the prospective new
regionalizations, gateways and corridors
(19). The future international crossing point
at Kelloselka in Northern Finland, for in
.stance, has been presented in the Finnish
media as a 'breathing hole' for north-eastern
Finland, not only opening up links for busi
ness travel and goods transport but also fa
cilitating the passage of European tourists to
the Kola Peninsula and of Russians to Fin
land for shopping purposes. On the other
hand, future expectations in south-eastern
Finland are based very much on the huge
population potential represented by the two
large Russian cities, St. Petersburg and Vy
borg. Russian trade and visitors are seen as
being increasingly significant for the eco
nomic development of the area, but along
side the beneficial effects, the increasing

Thus major problems still exist in the border
areas, in spite of the increase in activities
and general optimism. The border still sepa
rates two completely different societies, and
the gap in standards of living between the
two sides is among the largest in the world.
The vast majority of Russian Karelians have
experienced a huge deterioration in pur
chasing power since the collapse of the So
viet Union, even though some people have
managed to accumulate enormous wealth.
As far as movement across the border is
concerned, it is clear that most Russians are
certainly not 'happy border-crossing con
sumers', nor will they become such for a
very long time. It is thus very unlikely that
this area will become an 'integrated border
land' where people, goods and ideas 'flow'
without restriction (19).

EPILOGUE
Contrary to traditional ways of understand
ing them as fixed lines, boundaries have
meanings that are historically and spatially
contingent. This contingency is also mani
fest in the possibilities for spatial movement
and, hence, tourism. Our concrete example
in this paper has been the changing mean
ings of the Finnish-Russian border, which is
a particularly interesting example of a for
merly closed but now increasingly open
border. It was strictly guarded and to a great
extent closed in Soviet times, partly due to
the fact that it was the only border between
the leading socialist super power and a small
western capitalist state. While it was often
presented in the international literature of
political geography as an example of an
ideological boundary, it was a taboo �n Fin-
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nish discourse that was seldom discussed in
public. This reflected the vagaries of his
tory, in that Finland had had to cede more
than 10 percent of its area to the Soviet Un
ion as a consequence of World War II,
meaning the loss of the eastern part of its
territory, the need to evacuate and resettle
more than 400,000 Finns and the signing of
agreements that linked the state politically to
the grey zone between east and west.

sources representing a historically and geo
graphically authentic Karelian heritage.
The border was of interest to many foreign
visitors to Finland, and also the Finns them
selves. Since it was closed, tourist traffic
was allowed across it only at certain points,
to certain Soviet cities, while most of the
ceded areas were completely closed. The
former inhabitants did not have any chance
of visiting their former homes. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the border has
become much more open and all kinds of
activity over it have increased enormously,
including tourism. An evaluation of the
roles of this border shows that the same bor
der can have different meanings according
to the prevailing historical and social condi
tions. All the above examples illustrate the
fact that boundaries are not mere lines on
maps or in the forests, but extremely mean
ingful symbols and institutio�s, which are
deeply sedimented in various social prac
tices and discourses. Besides its economic
and cultural functions, tourism is one of the
major indicators of the more general mean
ings attached to borders.

Since the 19th century, Karelia and its cul
ture have been closely related to Finnish na
tionalism and the imagined geography of
Finland. When the physical border was
moved westwards after the Second World
War, the whole of former Finnish Karelia
did so too: its people, its heritage and even
its symbolical landscapes. Thus the local
culture of the Karelian borderlands was con
served, maintained, re-produced and repre
sented after the war in those areas carrying
the name "Karelia" that still existed inside
Finnish territory. Since then, these "new"
areas have been promoted as tourist re
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FIGURE 1
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Contemporary regional divisions of Karelia. Finnish Karelia, or Westem Karelia, has
traditionally included the areas of Northern and Southern Karelia (still existing by these
names on Finnish side of the border) and the territories that Finland had to cede to the
Soviet Union after the Second World War (the Karelian Isthmus, the Lake Ladoga area
and the Karelian borderlands). On the Russian side, the Karelian Republic consists of the
historical areas of Viena and Aunus and most of the ceded territories. The Isthmus
belongs to the Leningrad administrative region (oblast).
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Reconstructing the Karelian socio-cultural space and tourist landscapes in Eastern
Finland. The Road of the Bard and Boundary and the numbers of military, Orthodox
and Karelian memorials and events advertised in the various Finish Border communes
in 1992.
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